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Abstract
It is now widely accepted that monetary authorities should have a mandate to
safeguard financial stability and that macroprudential policies should be an integral
part of such a mandate. However, our understanding of the effectiveness of macro-
prudential policies and their impact on monetary policy target variables and, more
broadly, on macroeconomic outcomes, is still limited. This paper addresses that gap
and examines the development and impact of macroprudential policies in the euro
area. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we construct a novel index that
captures the stance of the macroprudential policy and we highlight its main stylised
facts since the inception of the euro in 1999. Second, we employ a combination of
a narrative approach and a structural VAR method to identify both unanticipated
and anticipated exogenous variations in macroprudential policies. Our results show
that unanticipated or surprise shocks and anticipated or news macroprudential policy
shocks exhibit differentiated effects on macroeconomic variables and that they both
contribute over the medium term to safeguard financial stability. We also find signif-
icant linkages between monetary and macroprudential policies over a sample period
that includes events such as the great financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis.
Keywords: macroprudential policy, financial stability, euro area, monetary policy
JEL codes: E58, E61
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“[Macroprudential policy] has the potential to bring about the biggest change
in the policymaking environment for a generation.” (Paul Tucker, Bank of
England, at the colloquium ‘the great financial crisis’ held at the ECB, 2010)
1 Introduction
There is now a consensus that price stability is not a sufficient condition to achieve eco-
nomic prosperity. Financial stability matters. The financial system can be a source of
risks as well as a propagation mechanism for shocks. In addition, it is now evident that
systemic stability of the financial system cannot be secured by exclusively focusing on the
soundness of individual institutions, that is, with microprudential supervision (see Kahou
and Lehar, 2017). A macro, i.e. system-wide, approach is also needed to enhance and
secure financial stability.
Although the issue of prudential supervision has been receiving increasing attention, it
is important to note that macroprudential policies are not new, they have been employed
by policymakers for a long time (see Elliott et al., 2013 for a historical review of macropru-
dential policies in the US, and Kelber et al., 2014 for a European historical perspective).
The emphasis on having a macroprudential framework that includes a defined and specific
target about financial stability, the prevention and mitigation of systemic risk is, how-
ever, relatively new. One of the consequences of this relatively novel policy framework
is the lack of a consolidated body of academic work informing about the effectiveness of
these policies from a macro perspective (see Galati and Moessner, 2018). Furthermore,
we note that there is no consensus yet about the interaction between macroprudential
and monetary policies, neither from a positive nor a normative perspective (Gelain and
Ilbas, 2017). Consequently, our understanding of the efficacy of macroprudential poli-
cies as well as their impact on monetary policy target variables and, more broadly, on
macroeconomic outcomes, is still limited. We address this gap and we focus on the euro
area. Since it was established, the euro area has been pro-active in the development and
implementation of macroprudential policies. Moreover, there have been continued efforts,
such as the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), to coordinate
monitoring of the financial system and to improve macroprudential supervision. However,
policymakers, macroeconomic analysts and academics acknowledge the need for empirical
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insights about the evolution of aggregate macroprudential policies and their transmission
mechanism through other macroeconomic variables. These are the two issues this paper
contributes to shed light on.
First, we provide an overview of the stance of the macroprudential policy in the euro
area since its inception in 1999. We employ MaPPED, a database constructed by the
ECB in conjunction with national monetary authorities, to create EAMPP (Euro-Area
MacroPrudential Policy), a novel index representing the aggregate level of macropruden-
tial policies in the euro area.1 The construction of the time series of EAMPP allows us
to highlight the main stylised facts of the aggregate macroprudential policy. One of those
stylised facts worth noting is that macroprudential policy has progressively tightened over
the sample period, and therefore its evolution contrasts with that of monetary policy.
These policy dynamics are the result of periods of severe financial instability and defla-
tionary pressures in the euro area such as the aftermath of the great financial crisis (GFC)
and the European sovereign debt crisis.
Second, we are the first to provide evidence about the effects of exogenous variations
in macroprudential policies in the euro area within a structural econometric approach.
Our methodology addresses the issue of foresight in econometric models and the presence
of ‘news’ shocks influencing macroeconomic outcomes, which is particularly relevant in
the case of macroprudential policies as there may be changes in the macroprudential
stance that are anticipated by agents. We identify two types of shocks driving non-
systematic fluctuations of macroprudential policies: an unanticipated or surprise shock,
and an anticipated or news shock.
We examine the impact of those two shocks on the economic variables that are ob-
jectives of both macroprudential and monetary policies such as systemic risk, prices and
output. Our results show that there are differences in the dynamics following each type of
shock, and that they both contribute over the medium term to safeguard financial stability
by moderating systemic risk, and, importantly enough, by lowering the pro-cyclicality of
credit growth. Regarding the interaction with monetary policy, we find that macropruden-
tial policy shocks have an insignificant effect on inflation stability, the primary monetary
policy target for the ECB, and that monetary policy reacts such that the macroeconomic
1The use of MaPPED to construct this index presents several advantages relative to other databases
previously used in the literature. See Section 2 below and Section 10.1 of Budnik and Kleibl (2018) for
discussions about the differences between MaPPED and other macroprudential databases.
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policy mix is effective to achieve its goals.
Our paper relates to two strands of the economics literature. One strand is the em-
pirical research about the effects of macroprudential policies on macroeconomic outcomes
and their interaction with monetary policy. Most of the studies in this literature capture
variations in macroprudential policies by constructing an index that aggregates actions
taken over a number of macroprudential policy instruments.2 The construction of those
indices has typically been done by using one or more than one of the databases from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), central
banks, bank regulators or other national sources (see Alam et al., 2019, Appendix I Table
4, for a detailed summary of 17 databases employed in this literature). Some of those
studies include both advanced and emerging market economies (e.g. Kuttner and Shim,
2016; Cerutti et al., 2017; Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018; Alam et al., 2019; Richter
et al., 2019) while others examine a particular group of countries (e.g. Vandenbussche
et al., 2015 analyse Central Eastern and South Eastern European (CESEE) countries;
Bruno et al., 2017, Kim and Mehrotra, 2017 and Kim and Mehrotra, 2018 Asia-Pacific
countries; Budnik and Kleibl, 2018 and Budnik, 2020 European Union member states;
Rojas et al. (2020) Latin American countries; and Klingelho¨fer and Sun, 2019 study the
case of China).
Those studies cited above employ different econometric methods to assess the effec-
tiveness of macroprudential policies. Cerutti et al. (2016) and Budnik and Kleibl (2018)
examine the correlation between changes in prudential instruments and the evolution of
financial stability measures such as credit growth and house prices. Although the results
of those studies are illustrative about the effects of prudential policies, analyses that use
dynamic panel regression methods address some of the limitations of correlation analysis.
For example, Alam et al. (2019) find that an average effect across 63 countries is that
all macroprudential policies impact on household credit growth. Their impact on house
prices is, on the other hand, weaker. Only the tightening of certain tax-related macropru-
dential policies can significantly moderate house price growth. This empirical evidence
based on a large set of countries is in line with Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) and
also consistent with the findings of Kuttner and Shim (2016) and Vandenbussche et al.
2A stylised feature of macroprudential policies is that the number of policy actions per country per unit
of time, typically a quarter, is low. This is the reason these studies are typically undertaken within an
international context to exploit the cross section nature of the panel structure to have enough variation to
yield statistical meaningful results.
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(2015).
The studies cited above typically control for endogeneity using GMM methods, how-
ever, caution should be taken when making causal claims due to issues such as reverse
causality and contemporaneous effects.3 Few papers in the literature use a structural
VAR (SVAR) approach that does not hinge on the timing assumption and therefore are
able to claim causal effects of exogenous variations in macroprudential policy actions and
to provide economically interpretable impulse responses.4 Kim and Mehrotra (2017) and
Klingelho¨fer and Sun (2019) address this issue using a recursive ordering identification
strategy by means of a Cholesky decomposition. The latter study finds that a macro-
prudential policy shock lowers credit and that there is not an explicit trade-off between
macroprudential and monetary policies. This finding lends support to the view that the
two policies can act independently of each other. This is the thesis proposed by Svensson
(2018) and Beau et al. (2012). However, the evidence in Kim and Mehrotra (2017) sug-
gests that the qualitative impact of monetary policy rates is similar to the macroprudential
policy instrument, and therefore a trade-off arises between the two policies. Theoretical
studies by Angelini et al. (2011), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Gelain and Il-
bas (2017) show that there is scope for welfare gains derived from coordination between
the two policies. The empirical evidence about the impact of macroprudential policies on
monetary policy target variables is therefore still inconclusive.5
The use of recursive ordering as an identification strategy presents certain limitations,
especially so in the presence of foresight in economic models (see Ramey, 2016).6 Iden-
tification strategies in SVAR analyses that are robust to the presence of foresight and
that allow the identification of both surprise and news shocks is the second strand of the
literature our paper is related to. In particular, our study employs a combination of a nar-
3See Galati and Moessner (2018) for a detailed discussion about disadvantages of panel regression and
other methods employed to examine the effectiveness of macroprudential policies.
4An alternative method to infer the causal effect of one particular macroprudential instrument, LTV
caps, on credit and house prices has been employed by Alam et al. (2019) and Richter et al. (2019). They
use an inverse propensity-score weighted estimator and conclude that changes in the maximum LTV likely
cause credit and house price changes.
5Alternative empirical evidence based on correlation analysis between macroprudential and monetary
policy actions also provide an ambiguous picture. Cerutti et al. (2017) show that there is not a clear pattern
across countries and Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) find a lack of pattern across macroprudential
instruments.
6An alternative identification method applied to proxy VARs in the context of macroprudential policies
in the US is developed by Budnik and Ru¨nstler (2020). The identification of policy shocks is done using as
an instrument a constructed macroprudential policy narrative indicator based on capital requirements and
mortgage underwriting standards. One of the implications of their study is that static panel regression
methods may significantly underestimate the impact of policies.
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rative approach and the econometric methodology developed by Barsky and Sims (2011)
to identify both an unanticipated or surprise shock and an anticipated or news shock that
drive exogenous variations of the variable of interest. We note that, until recently, most
of the literature on identification of structural shocks has focused on the effects of unan-
ticipated or surprise shocks. However, agents may receive signals about future changes
before those changes actually take place and the empirical strategy needs to address the
non-uniqueness problem generated by foresight in econometric models (see Leeper et al.,
2013). Kurmann and Otrok (2013) follow Barsky and Sims (2011) to examine the impact
of news shocks about future total factor productivity (TFP) in the term structure of in-
terest rates.7 The identification of news shocks has also been used to assess the impact of
unanticipated and anticipated fiscal and monetary policy shocks. For the case of the US,
Mertens and Ravn (2012) provide evidence of the differential effect of both types of shocks
on macroeconomic aggregates while Forni and Gambetti (2016) document their impact on
the exchange rate and the trade balance. Anticipated shocks in monetary policy in the US
have been identified by Ben Zeev et al. (2019) using the Barsky and Sims (2011) method-
ology. In this case, news shocks that may cause agents to anticipate policy rate decisions
can arise as a consequence of forward guidance, or more generally, commitments to future
actions, changes in the membership of committees, or even public commentary by market
participants. Our paper will relate to this literature because it will be the first to examine
the impact of both unanticipated and anticipated shocks within a macroprudential policy
context.
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the construc-
tion of the Euro Area Macroprudential Policy index (EAMPP) and we present its main
stylised facts over the last two decades. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology
that we employ to obtain both unanticipated and anticipated prudential policy shocks and
to examine their impact on macroeconomic outcomes. In Section 4, we discuss the main
empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
7This method has also been used within the business cycle literature by, among others, Beaudry and
Portier (2014) and Ben Zeev and Khan (2015).
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2 Euro Area Macroprudential Policy Index (EAMPP)
To construct the Euro Area Macroprudential Policy index (EAMPP) we employ the Macro-
Prudential Policies Evaluation Database (MaPPED). This database is the product of a
collective effort by ECB staff and experts from national central banks and supervisory
authorities from the 28 EU member states.8 For the euro area countries, MaPPED pro-
vides information about 1205 policy actions between 1995 and 2019.9 These policy actions
relate to the following 11 different macroprudential policy tools (or instruments): capi-
tal buffers, lending standards, maturity mismatch tools, limits on credit growth, exposure
limits, liquidity rules, loan loss provisions, minimum capital requirements and risk weights,
leverage ratio, and the final one labelled as ’other measures’.
We now highlight some of the key characteristics of MaPPED and how it compares
with other existing macroprudential policy databases.10 The first characteristic is that
MaPPED provides details about the life-cycle implementation of each policy instrument
in each country, that is, the activation date, subsequent changes in the scope or the level of
the policy, and the deactivation date. Policy actions are therefore the unit of observation.
For instance, an activation, a subsequent change in the level, and a posterior deactivation
of a policy that limits credit growth and volume are three different policy actions that
belong to the same policy instrument. This allows to measure the impact of each policy
not only when it is first activated, but also when it is recalibrated or deactivated. This
analysis would not be possible with other databases because the only information provided
is the date the policy instrument was first implemented. A second characteristic is that the
survey designed for MaPPED is such that policy tools and actions reported are perfectly
comparable across countries. This overcomes potential biases that may arise employing
other databases due to their lack of harmonisation in open-text questionnaires (Budnik and
Kleibl, 2018).11 The third and final characteristic we note is that the information set about
8In particular, 90 experts from the EU national central banks and supervisory authorities that belong
to the Financial Stability Committee (FSC) were involved in the creation of MaPPED.
9We note that we only employ a subset of countries included in the database, those of the euro area.
However, MaPPED originally provided details on almost 1700 macroprudential policy actions in the 28
member states of the EU between 1995 and 2014. Since the database is regularly updated (twice a year),
we expand the sample period using information up to the second quarter of 2019.
10The other main databases are (i) the one from the IMF used in Lim et al. (2011), (ii) databases from
BIS employed by Shim et al. (2013), (iii) the IMF Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments Database
(GMPI) used in Cerutti et al. (2017), and (iv) the iMaPP by Alam et al. (2019).
11MaPPED has been carefully designed with that concern in mind and respondents can only choose from
a closed list of policy tools. Thus, both the questionnaire design and subsequent revisions are consistent
and aiming at ensuring comparability across countries and across measures (Budnik and Kleibl, 2018).
This is particularly relevant for the case of the EU because other datasets may include policies in some EU
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each policy provided by MaPPED is broader than the one given by other macroprudential
policy databases. In particular, it specifies, among other things, the announcement date
of the policy,12 the stance (loosening, tightening, or ambiguous), the main character of the
policy (macroprudential or microprudential), and whether it has a countercyclical design
or not.13 We will therefore use the announcement date of the policy to assign a particular
value to a policy action as it will be described below.14 This will be important later on
in the empirical analysis to time the identified policy shocks. We will assume that agents
can react to policies from the moment they are announced. This issue relates to the
arguments in Leeper et al. (2013) who note that foresight problems arise as a consequence
of inside as well as outside lags.15 The latter arise whenever there is a delay between the
legislation’s passage and its implementation. This happens in many of the macroprudential
regulations that are introduced around the world.16 In such a framework, the use of the
enforcement date rather than the announcement date could contaminate the identification
of an “unanticipated” shock since, by definition, agents would have already known about
the policy action, implying the shock would no longer be exogenous.
We have highlighted some of the main features of the database we employ to construct
the index and we now proceed to describe how the index has been constructed. First, we
only include policies that are ‘binding’. Therefore, we do not include policies that are just
recommendations. Otherwise, recommendations that do not end up being implemented
would bias the results. Second, policy actions will be signed and weighted following the
scheme proposed by Meuleman and Vander Vennet (2020). We assign a positive value
states and not in others, even though these instruments have been harmonised across the whole of the EU.
Moreover, there is not always an harmonised perception of what should be reported as a macroprudential
measure when responding to open-text questionnaires in alternative databases.
12While MaPPED provides the enforcement date as well as the announcement date for almost all policy
actions, most of the previous databases only contain information about the former.
13In the questionnaire, an instrument is said to have a countercyclical design if: (i) its level automatically
tightens when systemic risks intensify and loosens when they fade, or (ii) it is regularly (e.g. quarterly)
revised and calibrated along with the intensity of cyclical systemic risk by, for example, linking the revisions
of an instrument to the evolution of indicators of systemic risk (Budnik and Kleibl, 2018).
14MaPPED does not provide the announcement date for 182 out of the 1205 policy actions originally
reported in the database. Even though those policy actions with a missing announcement date will be
removed from the index to carry out the empirical analysis in subsequent sections, we keep them here in
the construction of the EAMPP because in this section the index will only be used to show the stance of
the macroprudencial policy in the euro area. Therefore, in this section, we assume that the announcement
date for those policies coincides with the enforcement date. In any case, we have run a robustness exercise
of the empirical analysis where we include those policies for which the announcement date is not provided
and the results barely change.
15These labels were introduced by Friedman (1948). In line with Leeper et al. (2013) we use that
terminology to refer to the “recognition” and “decision” lags (inside lag), and to how long it takes between
the enaction and effectiveness of a policy (outside lag).
16For instance, around 54% of the total policy tools covered by MaPPED for euro area countries expe-
rience a delay between announcement and implementation dates.
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Table 1: Weighting scheme of a macroprudential policy tool





































Deactivation Dependent on the life-cycle of the tool (cumulative index drops to zero)
Notes: Description of the weights used to construct the cumulative index for each policy instrument based on
Meuleman and Vander Vennet (2020).
to tightening actions, a negative value to loosening actions, and a value of zero to pol-
icy actions that have an ambiguous impact or if no macroprudential policy action was
announced in that month. Policy actions are given different weights according to the
following criteria. First time policy activations receive the highest weight, a lower value
is assigned to changes in the level, an even lower value to changes in the scope, and the
lowest weight is given to maintaining the existing level and scope of a policy tool. Once
the tool is deactivated, the cumulative index drops to zero. A description of this weighting
scheme applied to each macroprudential policy instrument can be found in Table 1.
We have already mentioned above that the information provided by MaPPED allows
us to link all the policy actions of each policy instrument. We therefore construct for each
policy instrument an index that is a cumulative sum of the measures taken during the
period from which the specific policy is activated until it is deactivated, using the weight-
ing scheme we just described above. Therefore, the index reflects the macroprudential
policy stance of a given policy instrument for a given country, where a higher value of the
index reflects a tightening stance of the macroprudential policy. This exercise results in
around 470 indices representing the life-cycle of policy instruments or tools across euro
area countries over our sample period. We then use those indices to construct a macro-
prudential policy index for each country by simply adding up the indices of all the policy
instruments implemented within a particular country.17 Finally, we add up the country
indices weighted by GDP shares to obtain a single index for the euro area that we call
17All instruments carry equal weight. This is the method employed in the literature on macroprudential
policy instruments because of the difficulty to predict the type of policies that are more effective in safe-
guarding the stability of the financial system. Some examples are Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018),
Cerutti et al. (2017), and Kim and Mehrotra (2018).
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Figure 1: Euro Area Macroprudential Policy Index (EAMPP). Changing composition: EA-11 (1999), EA-12 (2001),
EA-13 (2007), EA-15 (2008), EA-16 (2009), EA-17 (2011), EA-18 (2014), EA-19 (2015).
Euro-Area MacroPrudential Policy index (EAMPP).18
2.1 Macroprudential Policy Stance in the Euro Area
We use EAMPP, the aggregate index constructed following the procedure described in the
previous section, as an indicator of the stance of the macroprudential policy in the euro
area. Figure 1 plots the monthly time series of this index as well as its quarterly changes
from 1995 until June 2019.19 We now describe some of the main stylised facts of this policy
stance over the last 25 years. First, the fact that the index displays a positive value at the
beginning of the sample implies that there were macroprudential policies already at work
at the start of the sample and that they had been implemented prior to the creation of the
euro with, on average, a tightening stance. Second, there is a small positive trend of the
index up until the GFC. Third, despite the fact that at the beginning of the GFC in 2009
there is, on average, a loosening in the stance of the macroprudential policy, continued
concerns by the monetary authorities about financial stability in the euro area, later fuelled
by the sovereign debt crisis, are reflected in a clear upward trend in the EAMPP index
during the following seven years. The tightening stance following the GFC came as a
result of a consensus about the need to ensure financial stability by moderating the build
up of systemic risk and increasing the resilience of the financial system. This consensus
18We use the average GDP share over the period 2008-2015. In any case we note that, since GDP shares
are stable over time, assigning time-varying-GDP-share weights has very limited impact on the level of the
index. A detailed description of the weights used for each country is provided in the Appendix.
19We decided to use quarterly rather than monthly changes to illustrate in a clearer, less noisy, way
variations in the macroprudential policy stance. We also note that the first value of EAMPP is not zero.
This is due to the fact that 185 out of the 1205 policy actions included in MaPPED had been implemented
before 1995. Therefore, EAMPP does take into account the effects of those policies that were part of the
macroprudential policy stance at the time.
10
is illustrated with the arrival of Basel III, an international agreement to implement a set
of measures with the aim to strengthen regulation, supervision and risk management of
banks. Numerous policies were then implemented and many others were recalibrated from
2012 onwards. For example, the largest quarterly change in EAMPP took place in the
third quarter of 2013 when many macroprudential policies were announced in most euro
area countries as a result of the introduction of the CRR/CRDIV package at the beginning
of 2014.20 Fourth, we note that the level of EAMPP is almost twice as tightening in 2016
as it was in the years prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis. Finally, macroprudential
policy appears to have taken a more neutral stance towards the end of the sample period
coinciding with a significant decline in the number of prudential policies implemented in
the euro area.21
We now complement the discussion about the stylised facts of the macroprudential
policy in the euro area with an overview of the evolution of the EAMPP index in tandem
with the monetary policy instrument as shown in Figure 2. The monetary policy index is
constructed with a combination of the EONIA rate and the shadow policy rate obtained
following the methodology developed by Wu and Xia (2016). In particular, we use the
EONIA rate from 1999 until 2009, and the shadow rate for the remaining of the sam-
ple.22 The use of the shadow rate overcomes the problem of the zero lower bound of the
interest rate and captures the implementation of unconventional monetary policies by the
ECB.23 Looking at this policy rate we note that, prior to the GFC, monetary policy was
relatively tightening due to inflationary pressures existing at the time (see Micossi, 2015
for a comprehensive analysis of the monetary policy of the ECB from 2002 until 2015).
However, with the onset of the Great Recession, deflationary pressures began to emerge.
This fact, coupled with a substantial drop in overall output, led to a change in the policy
stance to a significantly more lax monetary policy. This was especially evident after the
20The CRR/CRDIV package replaced the Capital Requirements Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49
and it was adopted in the EU to strengthen the regulation of the banking sector and to imple-
ment the Basel III agreement within the EU legal framework. A description of policies announced
in 2013 and subsequently implemented in 2014 as a consequence of the CRR/CRDIV package can be
found here: https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/150625_review_macroprudential_policy_
one_year_after_intro_crdcrr.en.pdf
21For instance, the average number of policies announced in the period 2016-2019 was approximately 2
per quarter. This contrasts with an average of around 13 policies per quarter announced during 1999-2015.
22The period with a common monetary policy for the euro area countries, from 1999Q1 until 2019Q2,
will therefore constitute our sample for the empirical analysis later in the paper.
23We note that the correlation between the EONIA rate and the shadow rate between 2004Q4 and
2008Q4 is 0.98. 2004Q4 is the first period for which data on the shadow rate is available, while 2008Q4 is
the last period in which we use the EONIA rate as the monetary policy instrument.
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Figure 2: Macroprudential Policy and Monetary Policy in the Euro Area (1999-2019). Changing composition: EA-11
(1999), EA-12 (2001), EA-13 (2007), EA-15 (2008), EA-16 (2009), EA-17 (2011), EA-18 (2014), EA-19 (2015).
sovereign debt crisis. The shadow rate began to take negative values, reflecting uncon-
ventional policies such as Quantitative Easing (QE) and Forward Guidance introduced by
the ECB within a context of low inflation and growth in the euro area. It is therefore
evident that, in a context where deflationary pressures and financial instability co-existed,
monetary and macroprudential policies took an opposite stance. The character of both
policies also differed towards the end of the sample where monetary policy continued to
react to downside risks in inflation.
3 Empirical Strategy
Nonsystematic variations in macroprudential policy need to be identified in order to ex-
amine the causal effect of those policies on economic aggregates such as output, prices and
financial stability. Since the introduction of Structural VAR (SVAR) models by Blanchard
and Watson (1986) and Bernanke (1986), the econometric methods to recover structural
shocks from the residuals of the reduced-form VAR have been continuously evolving.24
These methods include, among others, contemporaneous restrictions (such as recursive
identification), sign restrictions, medium horizon restrictions, long-run restrictions, and
narrative methods. A recent strand of the literature argues that foresight, or news, about
future economic fundamentals or policies do have an affect on macroeconomic outcomes.
This research points to the importance of quantifying not only unanticipated but also
24We refer the reader to Ramey (2016) for a comprehensive review of methods employed to identify
shocks within the SVAR methodology.
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anticipated shocks. Lack of identification of the latter type of shocks leads to incorrect
identification of the former shocks (see Ramey, 2016). The reason is that foresight gen-
erates a second type of non-uniqueness as highlighted by Leeper et al. (2013). Failure
to correctly identify shocks as a consequence of foresight problems implies that not only
impulse response functions, but all conditional statistics, such as forecast error variance
decomposition (FEVD) or Granger causality test, will be misspecified.
The literature has so far employed three alternative methods to overcome this issue.
First, a narrative approach that introduces new information to aid identification (e.g.
Romer and Romer, 2010 or Ramey, 2011). Second, a high-frequency data identification
approach that exploits timing to identify news (e.g. Altavilla et al., 2019). Third, the
estimation of VAR models in such a way that anticipated effects can be isolated (see for
instance Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, Beaudry and Portier, 2006, or Uhlig, 2005). Within
this third type of methodology, we now focus on the one we use, the medium horizon
identification strategy of Barsky and Sims (2011). This methodology, which was first
applied to the RBC empirical literature (e.g. Barsky and Sims, 2011, Ben Zeev and Khan,
2015), has been implemented in different contexts when trying to capture anticipated
effects. For instance, it has been implemented to identify fundamental sources driving
movements in the term structure of interest rates (Kurmann and Otrok, 2013), news
shocks to defense spending (Ben Zeev and Pappa, 2017), and anticipated monetary policy
shocks (Ben Zeev et al., 2019).
We argue that, in our context, similarly to what it has been pointed out above with
fiscal and monetary policy, there may be changes in the stance of the macroprudential
policy that are anticipated by agents. News can, in this regard, include statements that
imply high degree of commitment to future policy implementations, informal comments
made by policymakers to the media, or implicit communication derived from other actions
(e.g. policy committees membership). Therefore, those news shocks need to be identified
as part of the exogenous variations in policy to establish causal relationships. We now
describe the way the information provided by MaPPED about policies that are systematic
responses to the financial cycle and the methodology developed by Barsky and Sims (2011)
will be part of our empirical strategy.
Let us assume that the macroprudential policy indicator, EAMPP, evolves according






t + ψ(L)ξt (1)
where εsurpriset is the unanticipated shock, ε
news
t is the anticipated shock, and ξt is a
shock reflecting the non-discretionary part or the systematic component of macropruden-
cial policies, i.e. macroprudencial policies that react to the financial cycle. Potentially, ξt











The restrictions of the model are such that γ(0) 6= 0, i.e., εsurpriset can affect EAMPP
contemporaneously, and δ(0) = 0, implying that εnewst is materialized at time t but af-
fects the macroprudential policy stance with at least a lag. It is worth noting at this
point that we minimize the effect of ξt on EAMPP by re-computing the EAMPP index
dropping all the policies that are specific reactions to the financial cycle.25 Therefore, by
excluding those reactive policies that have a countercyclical design we obtain an index
that is exogenous to the financial cycle. This is because the remaining policies included
in EAMPP can be regarded as exogenous in the Romer and Romer (2010)’s sense.26 In
particular, we can think of this new narrative measure of the EAMPP index as being
exogenous as long as the policies included in the index were implemented pursuing goals
such as long-run financial stability.27 Therefore, we assume that the only structural shocks
driving the adjusted EAMPP index are the macroprudential policy surprise shock and the
macroprudential policy news shock.
Finally, we note a few additional advantages of using the Barsky and Sims (2011)
methodology within our framework. First, a multivariate structure, unlike a univariate
25We explained in section 2 that MaPEED provides a classification of the policy actions that includes the
ones that explicitly target the financial cycle, i.e., those with a counter-cyclical design. In that sense, our
methodology is in line with the narrative identification approach followed by Richter et al. (2019). These
authors drop the policies targeting real as opposed to financial objectives to extract causal relationships
from the remaining prudential policies.
26The spirit of Romer and Romer (2010) has also been used by Fieldhouse et al. (2018) and Rojas et al.
(2020). Fieldhouse et al. (2018) within their narrative approach to examine the impact of anticipated
agency mortgage holdings, exclude those policy interventions that have short-run stabilisation objectives.
Rojas et al. (2020) adopt a narrative approach to identify exogenous changes in reserve requirements in
three Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) and show that the inclusion of cyclically-
policy motivated changes can lead to a bias in the results obtained.
27This is because, as mentioned above, the narrative measure of the EAMPP index only contains those
policies that are proactive, that is, that have as ultimate goal financial stability, which is a long-run goal.
For instance, we note the following remark: “At the same time it should be emphasised that the ultimate
objective of macro-prudential policy is financial stability and not stimulating credit and economic growth
per se” (ESRB, 2016). Our approach therefore follows from Romer and Romer (2010) who identify as
exogenous, in the fiscal policy context, those tax changes that were a response to concerns about long-run
economic growth or about the state of government debt.
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one, allows the identification of the impact of the news shock on the macroprudential
policy index because the other variables in the system will react contemporaneously to the
anticipated shock. Therefore, once εsurpriset is identified and controlled for, the news shock
εnewst is identified as the shock that is orthogonal to the surprise shock and best explains all
the remaining variations in EAMPP over a given horizon. Second, it does not rely on other
auxiliary assumptions about other shocks. This allows the implementation of this method
to a system with any number of variables without having to impose additional restrictions.
Third, medium-run identification strategies, as in our case, outperforms standard long-run
restrictions in finite samples (Francis et al., 2014). Fourth, it is not necessary to make any
assumption about the order of integration or about a cointegration relationship among
the variables included in the system.
3.1 Macroprudential policy surprise shock
We have reviewed above the main assumptions and advantages of our empirical strategy,
and we now proceed to the description of the econometric method we employ. Let us
consider the following SVAR(p) model:
B0Yt = B1Yt−1 + ...+BpYt−p + εt, (2)
where deterministic components are not included, Yt is a Kx1 vector of zero mean
endogenous variables, Bi, i = 0, ..., p is a KxK matrix, and εt is a Kx1 vector of struc-
tural disturbances. The structural elements of εt are mutually uncorrelated such that the
variance-covariance matriz Σε is a diagonal matrix containing the variance of the structural
shocks. Error variances are normalised to unity, therefore Σε = Ik.
This model can be expressed in the following reduced form:
Yt = A1Yt−1 + ...+ApYt−p + ut, (3)
where Ai = B
−1
0 Bi, i = 1, ..., p, ut = B
−1
0 εt, and the reduced-form error covariance
matrix is given by E(utu
′
t) = Σ. Under stationarity, the above process has a moving
average representation:
Yt = C(L)ut, (4)
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Identification of the structural shocks amounts to finding a mapping B−10 between
the residuals ut and a vector of mutually orthogonal shocks εt ; i.e., ut = B
−1
0 εt . The











′. This restriction is, however, not sufficient to identify B−10 because for any matrix




Q = B−10 , where Q is an
orthonormal matrix that also satisfies Σ = B˜0
−1
B˜0







−1′). This alternative impact matrix maps ut into another vector of mutually
orthogonal shocks ε˜t ; i.e., ut = B˜0
−1
ε˜t . Therefore, for some arbitrary matrix B˜0
−1
satisfying Σ = B˜0
−1
B˜0
−1′ (e.g., a Cholesky decomposition of Σ), identification reduces to
choosing an orthonormal matrix Q such that B˜0
−1
Q = B−10 . Hence, in a VAR in which
the EAMPP is ordered first, we identify εsurpriset as the shock associated with the first
column of the matrix B˜0
−1
obtained from a Cholesky decomposition.
3.2 Macroprudential policy news shock
The second shock driving macroprudential policy is identified using the forecast error
variance (FEV) maximization approach of Barsky and Sims (2011). Let denote the h-
step-ahead forecast error of the i-th variable yi,t in Yt by









where ei is a column vector with 1 in the i-th position and zeros elsewhere. Therefore,
based on a VAR with the variable EAMPP ordered first and Cholesky decomposition
B˜0
−1
, we solve for the following









 e1 s.t q(1) = 0, q′q = 1. (6)
We therefore proceed to identify the news shock as the column q of Q that maximizes
the sum of the forecast error variance of the macroprudential policy index over some
horizon from k to k, imposing two restrictions: first, that it does not contemporaneously
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affect EAMPP, and second, that it belongs to an orthonormal matrix Q.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Data and VAR Specification
We employ a seven-variable VAR model with quarterly frequency. The first variable is the
narrative measure of the EAMPP index described in Section 3. This index captures the
stance of the macroprudential policy in the euro area. To convert the index from monthly
to quarterly frequency, we take the observation of the last month of each quarter. We later
standardize the EAMPP index to ease interpretation of results. In order to assess the effect
of macroprudential policies and its relationship with monetary policy, we include a number
of variables that may be considered as targets for any of those two policies. In particular,
we include total credit to private non-financial sector, real gross domestic product (RGDP),
and core consumer prices. We note that excessive credit growth is one of the intermediate
objectives of macroprudential policy.28 Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that
domestic credit expansion is among the most robust and significant predictors of financial
crises (see e.g. Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012; Jorda` et al., 2015), and that total credit
to the private non-financial sector rather than just bank credit better predicts the risk
of systemic crises (Drehmann, 2013; and Alessi and Detken, 2018).29 In addition to this,
high procyclicality of credit is a source of a weakening financial system and less resilient
banking institutions, making it undesirable from a financial stability perspective. This is
the reason the inclusion of RGDP in the system will allow us to examine its evolution in
conjunction with credit. Finally, the prime monetary policy target is captured by core
CPI price series as it is customary in the literature.
In order to ensure the model incorporates forward looking variables, we include inflation
expectations and the index VSTOXX. Inflation expectations are measured by the ZEW
Financial Market Survey. This is a survey completed by financial experts who are asked
to express their medium-term expectations (6-month ahead) about the development of a
number of variables, including the inflation rate (and employed in other studies such as
28For instance, see ESRB (2013) for a review of recommendations, objectives and instruments of macro-
prudential policies.
29Notwithstanding this, we carry out robustness analyses with other measures of financial stability such
as a systemic risk index (CISS), bank credit, and household credit, as shown further below in Section 4.3.
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Hachula et al., 2020).30 VSTOXX is the European counterpart of VIX, and it is supposed
to capture future financial market volatility (e.g. Csonto and Ivaschenko, 2013; Ghysels
and Marcellino, 2018), global risk conditions (e.g. Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018
or Alam et al., 2019), and the global financial cycle (e.g. Passari and Rey, 2015, Cerutti
et al., 2019).31 Finally, we include as monetary policy instrument the combination of the
EONIA rate, from 1999 to 2009, and the shadow rate as developed by Wu and Xia (2016),
from 2009 until the end of the sample. We use this variable for the reasons explained in
subsection 2.1.
The sample period is from 1999:Q1 until 2019:Q2. The beginning of the sample coin-
cides with the date of the introduction of the euro currency. The VAR model is estimated
in levels with 4 lags of each variable.32 We estimate the model employing Bayesian tech-
niques and impose a Minnesota prior with the same values for the hyperparameters as in




Figure 3 presents the impulse responses of the SVAR variables to a one standard deviation
macroprudential policy surprise shock. The top-left figure shows that the unanticipated
shock generates a persistent effect on the policy index and therefore has a long-lasting
impact on the stance of macroprudential policy. Regarding the other variables in the VAR
system, we first discuss the ones that are more closely related to the ultimate prudential
policy objective of safeguarding financial stability. We start with the response of total
credit to the private non-financial sector. A tightening macroprudential surprise shock
generates on impact a drop in credit that later accentuates and persists over the medium
30Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) show that the omission of a variable capturing expected inflation could
give rise to the price puzzle in the monetary policy context within a VAR framework.
31As a robustness exercise, we have replaced the index VSTOXX with the VDAX index. VDAX is the
German analogue of VIX. We run our analysis with this index given the influence that this country has on
the financial cycle of the euro area as a whole. Results available upon request are found to be qualitative
the same.
32A logarithm transformation is applied to all variables except for the two policy instruments and
inflation expectations. A complete description of data, sources, and seasonal adjustments is provided in
the Appendix.
33We are grateful to Andree Kurmann and Christopher Otrok for making their code available online at
OpenICPSR.
34For robustness purposes, we have also performed the analysis with longer truncation horizons. Specif-
ically we set k = 30 and k = 40. We find quantitative and qualitative similar results.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Macroprudential Surprise Shock. This figure shows the median and 16th and 84th
posterior percentiles of the impulse responses to the macroprudential surprise shock from the SVAR
term. The finding that a prudential tightening reduces credit is in line with theoretical
arguments, and is also in line with work previously done in the literature employing
alternative methods as noted in the introductory section.
We now examine another central issue about macroprudential policy: whether it is
able or not to reduce the pro-cyclicality of credit. This is important because, if the policy
is effective, prudential authorities could avoid excess credit from building up in the system
during boom years that would later become a source of risk to financial stability. In this
regard, we observe that the response of aggregate output is clearly negatively correlated
to that of credit, therefore implying that a surprise macroprudential shock lowers the
pro-cyclicality of credit.
In addition, we note that VSTOXX, a variable that captures the global financial cycle
and risk conditions, is also reduced over the medium term. However, this decline is
preceded by an initial increase following the surprise shock. Expected future market
uncertainty and global risk conditions do not respond positively to the shock on impact.
It takes a few quarters before the rise in risk perception dissipates, but it ultimately
declines and falls below base line over the medium term.
The impulse responses of the variables that we have so far discussed indicate that, over-
all, a macroprudential surprise shock produces the desired effects: it curbs credit, reduces
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expected market volatility over the medium term and it moderates the pro-cyclicality of
credit.
We now turn to one of the topics that is still at the early stages of research but that is
essential to the design of macroeconomic policies: the relationship between macropruden-
tial and monetary policies. We already highlighted in the introduction that this literature
has not yet reach a consensus about neither the empirical evidence of such relationship
nor the normative aspects of it. To shed light on the former issue we first analyse the
impact of the macroprudential shock on the ECB’s primary monetary policy target, i.e.,
price stability. We observe that the effect of an unanticipated tightening macroprudential
shock on inflation expectations is initially negative although the uncertainty about the
estimates is large, hence the effect is not significant. Furthermore, the shock barely affects
core CPI prices. Therefore, the surprise macroprudential policy shock has no overall effect
on price stability.35
Regarding the response of the monetary policy rate, we find that the macroprudential
innovation causes the rate to move in the opposite direction, i.e., experiences a gradual
decline. This response suggests that monetary policy is able, through an accommodative
stance, to stop economic growth, a secondary monetary policy objective, from deteriorating
due to the decline in credit. This way, monetary policy can in this case be considered
to complement the tightening macroprudential policy shock such that policy objectives
are achieved.36 The consensus is that more than one policy objective, such as financial
stability and price stability, cannot be achieved with only one policy. Our empirical
evidence suggests that, within the euro area, macroprudential policies have not generated
a policy trade-off with regard to prices,37 and that monetary policy has therefore been
able to complement macroprudential policies.38
35This result reinforces the view that a macroprudential surprise shock is qualitatively different from
a monetary policy shock and that a lack of an explicit trade-off between those policies regarding prices
facilitates their complementarity as highlighted in previous literature (see Kim and Mehrotra, 2017).
36Budnik (2020) finds evidence that the coordination of macroprudential and monetary policy in EU
member states has been effective and that such coordination can enhance the policy mix. Additional
empirical evidence in Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2013) suggests that both policies tend to reinforce each
other in the euro area.
37This is in line with Svensson (2018) who argue that macroprudential policy has a small and unsystem-
atic effect on inflation. Moreover, this result is similar to Richter et al. (2019). They find that a tightening
macroprudential policy (note that they only focus on LTV tools) has a small positive effect, although in
their case it is significant, on the price level at very short horizons, becoming not significant at longer
horizons.
38This has previously been noted by IMF (2012): “If macroprudential policies have strong effects on
output, more accommodative monetary policy can offset these effects as necessary”.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Macroprudential News Shock. This figure shows the median and 16th and 84th
posterior percentiles of the impulse responses to the macroprudential news shock from the SVAR.
4.2.2 Anticipated Shocks
Figure 4 presents the impulse responses of the system variables to the news shock de-
scribed in subsection 3.2. We start by noting that an anticipated macroprudential shock
generates a gradual tightening in the policy itself that persists over time. Regarding finan-
cial stability, we find that a news shock of tightening nature reduces credit from the initial
period, credit then moderates its decline before dropping again over the medium term.
Aggregate output also falls initially but, more importantly, we note that total credit to the
non-financial sector and real output dynamics are such that their growth rates negatively
correlate, hence lowering the pro-cyclicality of credit. News shocks do, on the other hand,
have a muted effect on expected financial market volatility or global risk conditions.
Having examined the impact on financial stability measures, we now discuss the im-
pact of macroprudential news shocks on monetary policy and its targets, price stability
and output. An anticipated tightening shock generates an initial small increase in core
prices followed by a gradual and sustained decline. However, the estimate uncertainty is
high after a few periods and the impact on prices becomes insignificant. An insignificant
response is also observed for inflation expectations. The fact that the news shock barely
impacts the primary monetary policy objective of the ECB facilitates the complemen-
tarity of monetary policy. We observe that the monetary policy rate reacts to the news
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shock with an increase in its level, complementing the tightening nature of the anticipated
macroprudential shock and also driven by the small initial price increase. However, this is
soon reversed, and the monetary policy rate turns negative over the medium term which
helps to support growth conditions and avoid deflationary pressures. This response of
the monetary policy rate also helps, as pointed out above, to reduce the pro-cyclicality of
credit.
Our empirical evidence suggests that there are differences characterising the impact of
an unanticipated and an anticipated macroprudential policy shock and that their effects
appear to be effective from a policymaking perspective.
4.2.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The impulse responses have provided economic interpretation to the impact of macropru-
dential policy shocks. We now examine through the FEV decomposition a few additional
features that characterise the two types of shocks. Table 2 displays the median FEV de-
compositions of the two policy instruments together with their respective primary policy
objectives. We first note that, as we expect from the method employed here, the two
shocks combine to explain the vast majority of the variation in macroprudential policy at
all horizons. Second, there is a difference between the share of the rest of the variables’
variation explained by each shock at the short term relative to the medium and long term.
At short horizons, while surprise shocks explain very little of the variance decomposition,
news shocks account for a relatively larger share of the forecast variance. This suggests
that agents react quickly to new information about the stance of macroprudential pol-
icy. For instance, signals about future macroprudential policy strongly affect total credit
to the non-financial sector, accounting for around 20% of the forecast variance already
within the first quarter. A similar proportion is obtained by the surprise shock, although
in this case this is attained at the medium to long horizon, following a gradual increase
from a small percentage at short horizons. Overall, both macroprudential policy shocks
combine to account for around half of credit variability after 24 quarters. Third, we find
that macroprudential policy shocks do not explain much of the variation of prices. Neither
shock exceeds 12% of the forecast variance of the primary ECB’s monetary policy objec-
tive, and if both shocks are combined, they never account for more than 15% of prices’
forecast error variance.
22
Table 2: Median Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Surprise Shock News shock
Horizons % EAMPP % Core CPI % Credit % Shadow Rate % EAMPP % Core CPI % Credit % Shadow Rate
h=1 100.00 0.70 4.35 0.61 0.00 8.64 20.38 13.78
h=4 92.28 1.28 7.24 2.81 4.93 6.98 18.70 10.20
h=8 79.26 1.90 10.52 12.34 17.46 6.75 17.34 11.34
h=16 58.69 2.67 20.11 27.96 38.39 10.17 16.28 13.01
h=24 48.82 3.59 27.19 31.80 45.63 12.15 19.44 17.95
Notes: This table displays the median forecast error variance decomposition at different horizons for the two policy
instruments and the primary policy objectives.
We now compare these results with the ones in the other two studies that have ex-
tracted, via alternative methods, exogenous variations in macroprudential policies, namely,
Kim and Mehrotra (2017) for the case of four Asia-Pacific countries, and Klingelho¨fer and
Sun (2019) for the case of China. We note that while both of those studies find that
macroprudential policy surprise shocks do not explain much of the variability in prices,
only Klingelho¨fer and Sun (2019) find a more significant role in explaining credit fluctua-
tions. While this latter result is in line with ours, we note that we obtain different findings
regarding the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policy instruments. We
find that macroprudential policy surprise shocks contribute more to the variance decompo-
sition of the policy rate. This strong link between policies is perhaps not surprising given
that (i) prudential policy shocks affect output, and (ii) the euro-area monetary authorities
had to deal, over our sample period, with periods of major financial instability such as
the effects of the GFC, which were more severe in Europe than in Asia, and the euro area
sovereign debt crisis. This is also illustrated by the fact that the correlation between the
macroprudential policy index EAMPP and the monetary policy rate is strong (around
-0.90), negative and significant, while in the case of the Asia-Pacific countries, as shown
by Bruno et al. (2017), is positive and weaker.39
4.3 Robustness Analyses
4.3.1 Alternative target variables for macroprudential policy
In the previous section we included total private credit to non-financial institutions as the
variable capturing the intermediate target of macroprudential policy. We now consider
three alternative model specifications where we replace the credit variable by three other
variables that could potentially capture the objectives of macroprudential policy. In par-
39Specifically, they find a correlation of around 0.25 for a sample of 12 Asia-Pacific economies during
2004–2013. However, we note that their results are not directly comparable to ours because macropruden-
tial and monetary instruments are defined differently.
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ticular, we use a composite index named CISS, constructed by the ECB, that serves as an
indicator of systemic risk. The other two alternative variables are two different measures
of credit, bank credit and household credit. We briefly discuss here the main results and
do not report the impulse responses for space consideration, even though they are available
from the authors upon request.
First, the empirical results of the model with a measure of systemic risk, CISS, barely
change relative to the baseline model. This result is reassuring given that the macropru-
dential target of financial stability is not as explicitly defined as the targets in other type
of policies, such as monetary policy. Second, in the specification where we replace total
credit by bank credit, we find that the impulse responses of all the variables are quantita-
tively and qualitatively similar to the baseline model. The only difference we note is the
response of bank credit. In particular, our results show that the overall decline in bank
credit as a response to both type of shocks is more pronounced. In the third alternative
specification where we use household credit, we find that, in response to the news shock,
(i) there is an initial rise in VSTOXX, although the initial response is not significant, and
(ii) the decline in household credit is stronger than in the baseline model. Regarding the
responses to a macroprudential policy surprise shock, we find that (i) the decline in credit
becomes not significant, and (ii) output experiences an increase from the initial period.
4.3.2 Granger causality and autocorrelation
This robustness analysis aims to provide further evidence about the fact that the series
identified as surprise and news shocks can be considered as shocks. Ramey (2016) shows
that many of the structural shocks identified in the literature do not satisfy this property
because some of them are serially correlated or Granger caused by some other forward-
looking variables.40 To address this issue, we carry out the following two analyses. First,
we test for Granger causality using seven forward-looking survey series that contain infor-
mation on expectations about whether credit standards applied to loan approvals will be
tightened or eased within the following three months.41 A description of these series can
40Forni and Gambetti (2014) proposed a formal test to verify whether the identified shocks suffers from
the problem of informational insufficiency. However, this specific test cannot be easily implemented in
the context of the euro area given the lack of availability of numerous time series capturing all of the
relevant macroeconomic information at the aggregate level. Instead, we choose to capture expectations
about future macroprudential policy to check if our shocks are anticipated by the economic agents.
41These series are survey responses of senior loan officers from a representative sample of euro area banks.
The series focus on the “net percentage”, that is, the difference between the share of banks reporting that
credit standards applied to loan approvals will be tightened and the share of banks reporting that they
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be found in the Appendix.
We proceed as follows:
1. We extract up to three principal components fnt , n = 1, 2, 3, from the seven survey
series. We stop at n = 3 because the first three principal components already explain
around 98,4% of the total variance.
2. We run the following regression:







t−l + ωt (7)
where εit is the median of the identified shock, with i = surprise, news, and L =
1, ..., 4, N = 1, 2, 3.
3. We test whether the estimated principal components Granger-cause the identified
shocks using a standard F-test.
Table 3 shows the p-values for the different specifications for which the Granger causal-
ity test has been implemented. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in any of the cases
at any reasonable significance level. This result provides evidence supporting the exogene-
ity of both type of shocks as none of them are predicted by the surveys.
Table 3: Granger Causility test
Surprise Shock News shock
L\N 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 0.87 0.98 0.62 0.66 0.62 0.75
2 0.97 0.99 0.70 0.37 0.57 0.78
3 0.40 0.75 0.80 0.63 0.69 0.77
4 0.57 0.78 0.88 0.76 0.44 0.50
Notes: This table displays the p-value from a Granger-causility test. L and N are the number of lags and factors
included in each specification, respectively. The tests for Granger causality are conducted by regressing each type
of shock on the principal components extracted using the seven forward-looking survey series.
The second analysis is a test for serial correlation of the estimated structural shocks.
This is done by regressing the shocks on their own two lags and testing their joint sig-
nificance. The p-values are 0.47 for the surprise shock and 0.77 for the news shock, and
will be eased. Since these series are only available from 2003 onwards. We test for Granger causility using
the sample period 2003:Q1 until 2019:Q2.
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therefore, in neither of the two cases can the null of no serial correlation be rejected at
any reasonable significance level.
5 Conclusions
There is international consensus that economic authorities should have, as part of their
policy objectives, a mandate over financial stability. Complex and interconnected financial
systems across countries require a macro or system-wide approach to safeguard the stability
of the system. Monetary authorities develop and implement macroprudential policies to
achieve this goal with the aim to avoid economic crises driven by financial distress and
to experience long-term sustainable growth. Despite their importance, there is limited
knowledge about the overall stance of macroprudential policies, the effectiveness of those
policies and the way they interact with monetary policies. This paper addresses that gap
for the case of the euro area. The euro area presents a particularly interesting case of study
because of its inherently international structure and because, within the relatively short
life span of the euro, their countries have experienced historical episodes of significant
financial instability and economic crises.
We employ MaPPED, a comprehensive database about macroprudential policies con-
structed by the ECB in conjunction with the national central banks, to compute EAMPP,
a novel index that captures the overall stance of the macroprudential policy in the euro
area. We highlight the main stylised facts of this policy index and note that, over the last
two decades, it has progressively tightened. This contrasts with a progressively accom-
modative monetary policy. The contrasting general trend of these two policies may not be
surprising given this period of time has been characterised by both deflationary pressures
and risks coming from the financial system.
To examine the effect of macroprudential policies and their interaction with monetary
policy we employ a combination of a narrative approach and a structural VAR method
developed by Barsky and Sims (2011) to extract both unanticipated or surprise macropru-
dential policy shocks and anticipated or news shocks. This identification strategy addresses
the issue of non-uniqueness in economic models generated by foresight as shown by, among
others, Leeper et al. (2013). Our main finding is that there are differences characterising
the impact of each type of shock and that macroprudential policy contributes over the
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medium term to reduce credit growth, the pro-cyclicality of credit, systemic risk and,
overall, financial instability. Moreover, macroprudential policies do not have a significant
effect on price stability, the main target of monetary policy. Our findings also show a sig-
nificant link between macroprudential and monetary policies that, for our sample period
that includes the GFC and the sovereign debt crisis, implies an effective macroeconomic
policy mix.
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Appendix
Table A1: Description of the variables, source, and whether seasonally adjusted.
Variable Source X-13 ARIMA
Real GDP Federal Bank Reserve of St.Louis (FRED) Yes
Consumer Price Index: Total All Items Less Food, Energy, Tobacco, and Alcohol Federal Bank Reserve of St.Louis (FRED) Yes
Inflation Expectations (ZEW survey series: 6 months ahead) DataStream No
Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EONIA) Statistical Data Warehouse No
Euro Area Macroprudential Policy Index (EAMPPI) Authors’ estimation using MaPPED database No
STOXX 50 Volatility (VSTOXX) Qontigo Yes
DAX New Volatility (VDAX) Datastream Yes
Total Credit to the Private Non-Financial Sector Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Yes
Total Credit to Households and Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Yes
Credit to Private Non-Financial Sector by Domestic Banks Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Yes
Table A2: Description of the forward-looking credit surveys and data sources employed in the robustness analyses.
Variable Source
Credit standards-Large enterprises-Enterprise Bank Lending Survey Statistics, Statistical Data Warehouse
Credit standards-Long-term loans-Enterprise Bank Lending Survey Statistics, Statistical Data Warehouse
Credit standards-Overall-Enterprise Bank Lending Survey Statistics, Statistical Data Warehouse
Credit standards-Small- and medium-sized enterprises-Enterprise Bank Lending Survey Statistics, Statistical Data Warehouse
Credit standards-Short-term loans-Enterprise Bank Lending Survey Statistics, Statistical Data Warehouse
Credit standards-Household-Consumer credit Bank Lending Survey Statistics, Statistical Data Warehouse
Credit standards-Household-Loans for house purchase Bank Lending Survey Statistics, Statistical Data Warehouse
Table A3: Weights for the construction of the EAMPP based on GDP shares (%).
1995-2000 2001-2006 2007 2008 2009-2010 2011-2013 2014 2015-2019
Austria 3.28 3.21 3.20 3.19 3.17 3.16 3.15 3.15
Belgium 4.00 3.91 3.90 3.89 3.86 3.85 3.84 3.84
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Estonia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17
Finland 2.05 2.01 2.00 1.99 1.98 1.98 1.97 1.97
France 22.04 21.55 21.47 21.41 21.25 21.22 21.17 21.17
Germany 28.68 28.05 27.95 27.87 27.66 27.62 27.56 27.56
Greece 0.00 2.21 2.20 2.19 2.18 2.17 2.17 2.17
Ireland 1.94 1.89 1.89 1.88 1.87 1.86 1.86 1.86
Italy 17.21 16.82 16.76 16.71 16.59 16.56 16.53 16.53
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.21
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43
Luxembourg 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43
Malta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Netherlands 7.00 6.84 6.82 6.80 6.75 6.74 6.72 6.72
Portugal 1.89 1.84 1.84 1.83 1.82 1.82 1.81 1.81
Slovakia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
Spain 11.47 11.21 11.17 11.14 11.06 11.04 11.02 11.02
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